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ABSTRACT: Applying an approach of neo-institutional research, this article examines the 
history of company holdings of the national government and local governments in Finland in the 
longer term. The article examines the genealogy of the institutional forms of these holdings, the 
diffusion, adoption and adaptation of these forms, and the political legitimacy of new forms and 
the political de-legitimation of certain earlier forms. For theory, the results indicate that the 
individual tailoring of institutional forms offers flexibility but increases complexity. For practice, 
the results suggest that the company form may too easily marginalize alternative institutional 
forms such as co-operatives, associations, and foundations. 
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1 Approach, methodology, and material 
 
Despite waves of global privatization, governments continue to have substantial holdings in 
companies (Milward 2011, Musacchio & Lazzarini 2012, Wettenhall and Thynne 2011, Florio 
2014). This article examines company holdings of the national government and local governments 
in Finland in the longer term. Finland’s diversified institutional palette of business activities  by 
governments, the spectrum of the institutional forms of these activities and the many changes in 
these forms recommend this country for study. The article also pays attention to European Union 
influences upon institutional forms and alternative institutional forms to the company form. 
 
 Methodologically, this article represents historically oriented institutional analysis (Rowlinson 
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and Hassard 2013) utilizing both secondary and primary sources. The article derives its study 
questions from historically oriented neo-institutional research (Suddaby et al. 2013), which 
examines the diffusion, adoption, adaptation and actual application of institutional forms (Strang 
and Macy 2001; Kil and Strang 2006). The first two research questions are:  
 
(1) How do institutional forms of company holdings of governments diffuse from country to 
country and within countries?  
 
(2) How are institutional forms of company holdings of governments adopted and adapted for 
their actual application?  
 
The neo-institutional research that this article utilizes has turned away from examining the 
adoption of institutional forms on the sole grounds of performance and related criteria such as 
efficiency, profitability, shareholder value and return on investment. This neo-institutional research 
also examines the introduction of new institutional forms on grounds that they have become 
politically, ideologically or morally legitimate than their predecessor forms (Tolbert and Zucker 
1983; Meyer and Höllerer 2010; Fink 2011). The last study question is: 
 
(3) How does the enhancement of legitimacy rather than performance by means of new 
institutional forms advance the substitution of new forms for government holdings in 
companies for the predecessor forms? 
  
 This article delivers a longer-term narrative on the Finnish national government holdings in 
companies and a shorter-term narrative on the company holdings of local governments. The article 
is focused on the approximately one hundred years that have passed Finland became independent in 
1917, but also examines antecedents to government holdings evolved between 1809 and 1917. The 
periodization of the examination reflects discontinuities between the sub-periods of the entire study 
period. However, some of the developments that this article has to examine transcend the 
boundaries between these sub-periods. Besides what has actually happened and won predominance, 
this article considers counterfactuals of institutional forms of government business holdings, 
meaning historical alternatives that have either narrowly failed to come true or have been short-
lived or marginal (Zeitlin 2007). Besides the foremost Finnish national government company 
holdings in the longer term, the article also examines national government governance concerning 
these holdings, the local government company holdings, and alternative institutional forms to the 
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dominant company form. 
 
2 Introduction to the institutional forms of national and local government business holdings in 
Finland 
 
 It is first necessary to insert the company holdings of the Finnish national government and local 
governments into a broader context of institutional forms (see Table 1). The institutional forms of 
the national government holdings were imprecise until 1931, since when the national government 
either maintained public enterprises organized in a specific institutional form (form I in the table) or 
organized its holdings into the institutional form of the company (forms IV and V). Form II has 
been rare rather than common, and form III introduced in the 1980s to replace the earlier form I in 
the national government and in 2007 in local government is dying out. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  
Ever since 1931, the great majority of the Finnish government holdings in companies have been 
comprised of full, majority or minority equity ownership without any qualifications whatsoever 
made to the generic Company Act applied in all companies irrespective of ownership (see the 
general variant of institutional form V in Table 1). However, ever since the same year, for a 
minority of the government holdings the Company Act has been qualified with parliament acts of 
public interest legislation (form IV). The municipal analogy to the public interest legislation in 
national government, evolved during the recent decades, utilizes the possibility offered by 
Company Act to pass company by-laws at the shareholders’ meeting that the company shall not pay 
and becomes an equivalent to a non-profit organization (Table 1, the non-profit variant of form V). 
 
No general legislation on national or local government company holdings has ever been passed 
in Finland, and therefore such everyday expressions as ‘government company’ or ‘local government 
company’ are too imprecise to use in a research article. In 1947 the State Audit Act extended the 
State Audit Office auditing to national government direct or indirect majority holdings in 
companies (Puumalainen 1973, Ahonen 1987), but the auditing excluded all minority holdings. 
Since the 1990s the Finnish Parliament has legislated limits to the allowable minimum of national 
government holdings in some companies (for the present legislation see LVYO 2007), but no 
minima have been defined for most of these holdings. Moreover, such limits have no bearing 
whatsoever relating to the legal forms of the companies concerned but merely express the 
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parliamentary political opinion at the time of defining each limit. In principle, this article examines 
all sole, majority or minority holdings of the Finnish national government and the country’s local 
government in companies. 
 
3 Antecedents of national government company holdings from 1809 to 1918 
 
 In 1809 Finland ceased being an inseparable part of Sweden and became a constitutional grand 
duchy under Russia. In 1811 the national government that had been founded in Finland two years 
earlier founded the first organization that eventually became a company in which the government 
has holdings. However, this organization, a postal services agency, was not the first one by far in 
which the government later had had holdings, as it became a company only as late as in 1994. Other 
early national government agencies whose follower institutions have comprised companies with 
government holdings evolved in road and water construction (1816; the predecessor of Destia plc 
founded in 2008), the railways (1862; the predecessor of VR Group plc founded in 1995), the post 
savings bank (1887; the predecessor of a company founded in 1988), and the Outokumpu mining 
enterprise (1910; company in 1910–1921 and again since 1932). (Ahonen 1987, Junka 2010, Table 
2.) 
 
 TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 In 1860, private investors founded the first antecedent of Finland’s 1990s to early 2010s national 
champion company Nokia plc. Nokia has important origins in military electrical assembly 
workshops founded by the Finnish government in the 1920s as early predecessors of the 
telecommunications equipment company Televa Ltd that the government established in 1974 but 
sold to Nokia in steps between 1981 and 1987 (Häikiö 2001, Table 2). Once Finland became 
independent in 1917, the Finnish government acquired holdings of previous Russian infrastructures 
in Finland including international and long-distance telephone lines and telegraph lines. These 
infrastructures were first governed in the institutional form of a government agency and ultimately 
from 1994 to 2002 in the form or a company, which merged in 2002 with another company whose 
majority holdings are in Swedish hands (Table 2). Moreover, in 1918 the Finnish government 
acquired majority holdings in a company whose inheritor company merged in 1998 with a Swedish 
company to comprise one of the largest present-day global companies in the forest industries, the 
Swedish-Finnish Stora Enso plc (Ahonen 1987; Table 2).  
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4 Evolving forms of national government holdings in companies from 1918 to World War II 
 
 In the early 1920s the Finnish government founded the embryo of Kemira plc for fertilizer and 
explosives production and the Veitsiluoto enterprise to tap state forest wealth in northern Finland. 
At the same time, the government started the construction of a hydroelectric power station for the 
Imatran Voima enterprise, which was the first predecessor of the present-day energy company 
Fortum plc. Moreover, since the 1920s the government established military industrial works, some 
of which were ultimately merged into the present-day Patria plc. (Ahonen 1987, Junka 2010, Table 
3.) 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The ambiguity of the institutional forms of the national government business holdings, the effects 
of the global economic depression and the pressures of national vested interests catalyzed the 
adoption of new institutional forms for these holdings. In 1931–1932 the government used its 
property in its chemicals enterprise and its Veitsiluoto, Imatra and Outokumpu enterprises as its 
contributions in kind in order to establish four companies organized according to the provisions of 
the generic Company Act. This transformation took place by means of adapting the institutional 
models of Weimar Germany, which was the foremost global metropolis country that Finland 
emulated those days (Puumalainen 1973, Ahonen 1987, Table 3). Contributing factors included the 
fact that German comprised the foremost international language of academic learning in Finland in 
those days, that Germany was the foremost source of general let alone technological imports to 
Finland, and that Germany was the only large Western country which easily accessible from 
Finland. Since those days all Finnish government holdings in companies are excluded from the 
government budget and the government financial management, and these holdings are also 
excluded in all official statistics from the public sector whose apparent size is therefore reduced 
(Ahonen 1987). 
 
 The Finnish government introduced early on adaptations of the institutional form of the company. 
After the repeal of prohibition in 1932, the government established the Alko Ltd alcohol monopoly 
company. In 1934, a targeted issue of stocks made the government the foremost owner in the 
broadcasting company Yleisradio Ltd, and the government also founded the betting monopoly 
company Veikkaus Ltd, which started its operations in 1940. In all three companies parliamentary 
public interest legislation supplements and qualifies the provisions of the Company Act. The 
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government assigned the governance duties of each company with government holdings – from its 
chemicals company to its betting company – to a specific ministry, and each ministry delegated the 
actual representation of the governmental ownership interest in the company to a designated civil 
servant. As a separate measure, in 1934 a targeted issue of stocks made the government the majority 
shareholder in southern Finland’s private-sector long-distance telephone company, which the 
government merged with its post and telecommunications agency making an end to private-sector 
long-distance and international telephony in the country for more than forty years. (Ahonen 1987, 
Table 3.)  
  
5 Forms of national government holdings in companies from World War Two to the 1980s 
 
 In 1945 the Finnish government established the antecedent enterprise of Vapo Ltd, the peat and 
wood pellet producer, and in the following year the government re-organized many of its holdings 
in metal industries into Valmet, which had a fund organized outside the regular government budget 
as its foundation. The same year a targeted issue of stocks made the government the majority owner 
in the airline Aero Ltd, the predecessor of the present-day national airline Finnair Ltd. In 1947 the 
Finnish government founded Neste Ltd to import and store crude oil and oil products. Later the 
company expanded to oil tanker shipping and oil refining. In 1952 the government used its property 
invested in Valmet as its contribution in kind at the establishment of Valmet Ltd, and in 1960, the 
government created the iron and steel industry company Rautaruukki Ltd. (Puumalainen 1973, 
Ahonen 1987, Junka 2010, Table 4, for Finnair Ltd see Table 3.) 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Since 1947 direct and indirect government majority holdings in companies are audited not only 
by auditors selected according to the provisions of the Company Act but also by auditors of the 
State Audit Office. Moreover, since World War Two besides the government, two affiliated 
organizations with full legal and financial independence acquired holdings in companies. Both 
organizations, the Bank of Finland and the Social Insurance Institution, are governed by deputies 
elected by Parliament. After the war, the practice continued that a ministry civil servant represented 
the owner’s interest in each company in which the government had holdings, except for the 
broadcasting company Yleisradio Ltd. Since 1949, Parliament has elected the members of the 
executive board of this company in proportion to the parliamentary strength of each party. (Ahonen 
1987, Table 4.) 
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 Since the 1950s, many of the companies in which the Finnish government had holdings 
substantially expanded, diversified and internationalized by means of exports and foreign 
subsidiaries. Obliged by the Company Act the government had to allow some smaller companies 
with government holdings to go bankrupt, whereas the larger companies that had financial 
difficulties ultimately survived (Ahonen 1987). A special function evolved within the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry for the coordination of the government holdings in companies and for the 
preparation of government policies as concerns these holdings. However the practice evolved 
before World War Two also continued, so that the governance towards each company in which the 
government had holdings was assigned to a designated government ministry, from among which the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry was only one. 
 
6 Privatizations of Finnish national government business holdings since the 1990s 
 
 The neo-institutionalism that this article applies requires attention not only to performance but 
also political legitimacy as a source of incentives to changes in the institutional forms of 
government holdings in companies. It could have been contingently otherwise, but the absence of 
performance problems to note in companies with Finnish government holdings and in the older type 
government public enterprises (see Table 1) suggest that we should look for reasons of political 
legitimacy-seeking by the Finnish government behind the privatizations that occurred since the 
1990s. Chronologically, the first influences suggesting privatizations were comprised of ideological 
impulses flowing to Finland from the Anglo-American countries since the turn of the 1970s and the 
1980s no less than to other market economies (Simmons et al. 2007, Fink 2010). The career 
managers of the companies in which the Finnish national government had holdings and in the the 
national government public enterprises also reaped success in persuading the political decision-
makers to empower both types of government business holdings better to tap the unlimited 
opportunities that the globalizing markets appeared to offer (Ahonen 1987). 
 
 Domestic political changes further increased the attractiveness of the Anglo-American examples 
of privatization in Finland. The strengthening conviction in the virtues of unfettered market forces 
together with the Gorbachevian thaw in the Soviet Union catalyzed the return of the political right 
to government in 1987 after an interval of two decades. Towards the end of the 1987–1991 
government coalition between the political right and the moderate political left of the Social 
Democrats and at the beginning of the 1991–1995 all-bourgeois government coalition, changes in 
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the comparative political legitimacy of alternative government strategies towards government 
holdings in companies spurred Finland to ride the global wave of privatizations of (Meklin and 
Ahonen 1998, Ranki 2012).  
 
 After a six-year preparation, the Finnish Parliament had legislated in 1987 a mild adaptation of 
the British institutional form of the public corporation by means of the new Public Enterprise Act 
(Ahonen 1987, see institutional form III in Table 1). This act and its successor acts of 2002 and 
2010 have laid the foundation for approximately twenty special parliament acts on individual public 
enterprises organized in the new institutional form. However, the substantially increased political 
legitimacy of privatizing government property made that most enterprises organized into the new 
institutional form did not retain this form for long. In 1994 the government used its holdings in its 
post and telecommunications public enterprise as its contribution in kind at the establishment of 
Post and Telecommunications Ltd., which was in 1998 split into a postal company and a 
telecommunications company. In 2002 the government sold the majority of its holdings in the 
telecommunications company to Sweden at the creation of the Swedish-Finnish Telia Sonera plc. In 
1995 the government used its holdings as another substantial contribution in kind at the 
establishment of the railway company VR Group Ltd. (See Table 2.) 
 
 In 1997 the Finnish government transformed its Post Bank enterprise, organized into a unique 
statutory institutional form without equivalents in the country, into Leonia Ltd, and sold its majority 
holdings in this company in 2001 to private-sector owners (Table 2). In 1997, the government 
merged several small defense industry companies, each earlier organized as older type public 
enterprises (on this institutional form see Table 1), into Patria Ltd (Ownership Steering 2015, Table 
3). In 2008, the government used its holdings in its roads maintenance public enterprise as its 
contribution in kind at the establishment of Destia plc, and in 2014 sold all its Destia holdings to a 
private-sector company (Table 2). In 2015, the State Forests, one of the two last remaining new type 
public enterprises in 2014, and the State Technical Research Center, a government agency, became 
companies in which the government holds all stocks (Table 2, Table 4). 
 
 The increased political legitimacy of the privatization of government property influenced the 
holdings of the Finnish national government in companies even more than its public enterprises. In 
several larger companies, what ultimately advanced to moderate or fuller privatization started with 
the modest introduction of these companies on the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1988–1989 
motivated on the grounds of improved supply of equity. During 1991–2014, the government sold 
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off its majority holdings in altogether twenty-four major companies. Let us consider the foremost 
from among the privatization measures. In 1996 Veitsiluoto Ltd merged with Enso-Gutzeit plc to 
comprise Enso plc, which became part of the Swedish-Finnish Stora Enso plc in 1998. Moreover, in 
further six large companies the majority holdings moved from the government into private-sector 
hands, namely Outokumpu plc in 1994, Valmet plc in 1996, Rautaruukki plc in 1997, Enso plc in 
1998, that part of the present-day Sampo Bank plc which had earlier been held by the government 
in 2000, and Kemira plc in 2005. In addition, the merger of the government computing company 
with a larger private-sector company created Tieto plc in 1999. On relinquishing its remaining 
Rautaruukki shares in 2011, the government became a minority owner in the Swedish SSAB plc. 
(Ranki 2012, Ownership Steering 2015, Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, Table 5.) 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 In the 1990s Finnish privatizations of national government holdings in companies neither derived 
from a strategy devised and implemented by a single government nor strategies of governments that 
had been predominantly bourgeois coalitions between the political right and center let alone 
comprised of the political right wing alone. In fact, few privatizations were completed during the 
all-bourgeois government of 1991–1995, but most were carried out during the two consecutive 
1995–2003 governments with a Social Democratic Prime M inister heading coalitions that besides 
his party included the political right and the political left, whereas the political center was in 
opposition. This political background suggests quite a wide political consensus on the immediate 
privatization of the government‘s sole or majority holdings in companies. For some time it looked 
as if the Finnish government would sell all its holdings in companies as soon as possible and almost 
at any price (Meklin and Ahonen 1998), but soon the government introduced waiting times to sell 
only when its holdings had reached a high in the stock market. After the 1995–2003 political 
coalition was succeeded by two consecutive coalitions with the Prime M inister from the bourgeois 
political center, the Finnish policies of privatizations of government holdings in companies faded 
by and large, which also coincided with global abatement in the privatization activity of 
government holdings in companies. (Ranki 2012, Ownership Steering 2015.) 
  
7 The institutional forms of governance towards national government business holdings since 
the 1990s 
 
 During the privatizations of national government public enterprises and national government 
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holdings in companies in Finland since the 1990s the institutional forms of the general governance 
towards these at holdings first stayed intact by and large. The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
retained the general coordination of the government holdings in companies, and the governance 
related to each company and each public enterprise was assigned to a designated government 
ministry. However, since 1991 Parliament has legislated itself the right to define a minimum 
allowable proportion for the government holdings in companies of Parliament’s choosing.  
  
 In 2007, Parliament passed an act on government ownership in companies and the ownership 
steering of these companies (LVYO 2007). Parliament consent is needed to allow company 
holdings by others than the government in companies in which the government is the sole holder 
and for reductions in the government share of company holdings below one half in companies in 
which its share has been above 50 and below 100 per cent (LVYO 2007, art. 3, sect. 1). In the act, 
‘by government ownership steering is meant the use of voting power of the government in the 
shareholders’ meeting and other measures with which the government in the capacity of a 
shareholder contributes to the governance and the operation principles of companies’ (LVYO 2007, 
art. 2, sect. 2, translated for this article). The government, meaning all ministers in a plenary 
session, has unlimited discretion to define the contents of the ownership steering. According to the 
official web pages of the ownership steering function situated at the Prime Minister’s Office, this 
function has to enhance the political objectives of each government as concerns the government 
holdings in companies (Ownership Steering 2015). According to the web pages indicated the 
ownership steering intends to ensure open, consistent and predictable government behavior as 
concerns its holdings in companies, responsible and knowledgeable membership in the company 
executive boards, professional and committed professional management of the companies, 
observation of the interest of the government and all other company owners and other stakeholders 
in the companies, and compliance with OECD corporate governance principles on transparent and 
open company decision-making and supervision in order to enhance shareholder value (OECD 
2004).  
  
 Despite the government ownership steering the governance towards companies in which the 
government and other public sector institutions have holdings is dispersed rather than comprising a 
unitary system. In 2007, the ownership steering unit situated in the Prime Minister’s Office was 
substituted for the earlier coordination function of the government holdings of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (Table 6). This unit directly governs government holdings in companies concerning 
which the government has declared a strategic ownership interest (Table 6, governance model A). 
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Adapting globally diffusing models that emphasize strategic government minority holdings in 
companies (Löyttyniemi 2011; Wettenhall and Thynne 2011, Inoue et al. 2013, Florio 2014), the 
government holding company Solidium Ltd manages government minority holdings in selected 
publicly traded companies on the principle of the sustainable maximization of shareholder value 
(governance model B). The institutional form of governance towards companies in which the 
government has holdings by designated ministries has also been retained, such as concerning 
companies in which public interest legislation supplements the provisions of the Company Act 
(governance model C, compare with institutional form IV in Table 1). The Social Security 
Institution retains holdings in companies (governance model D), and the pension funds have 
accumulated holdings that have grown into substantial proportions (governance model F). Table 6 
also indicates the governance of Finnish local governments concerning their holdings in companies 
(governance model E). 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The transfer of the governance of government minority holdings in companies to the holding 
company Solidium Ltd in 2007 intended to make an end to all politics as concerns these companies. 
However, the international business operations of some of these companies have continued to 
implicate the Finnish government both among national and foreign scholars and political activists 
(Myllylä and Takala 2011, Kröger 2012). Within Finland, the elevated management compensation 
in some of the companies in which the government has minority holdings in emulation of general 
global models (see, for instance, Shin 2012) has evoked criticism among some of those political 
decision-makers who originally introduced the compensation schemes (Ranki 2012). Moreover, 
public opinion often criticizes companies in which the government has minority holdings insofar as 
these companies shed workplaces at a more rapid pace than comparable companies in which the 
government has no holdings. 
 
8 The expansion of local government holdings in companies  
 
 Finnish local governments had holdings in companies before, but these holdings have truly 
expanded only since the 1980s. In 2001, the local governments had 944 companies with 13,500 
employees and a combined turnover of 2.1 bn euros, in 2010, 1,428 companies with 27,000 
employees and a turnover of 5.8 bn, and in 2014, 1,853 companies with 21,300 employees and a 
turnover of 8,7 bn (Statistics Finland 2015). Moreover, according to data from 2010 there were 176 
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local government public enterprises (representing institutional form II of Table 1), which had a total 
16,200 employees and a combined turnover of 5.6 bn.  
 
 The European Commission first banned the institutional form of the public enterprise of the 
Finnish national government (European Commission 2008) and next the adaptation of this form 
comprised of the institutional form of local government public enterprises introduced in a 2007 
amendment to the Local Government Act (European Commission 2010, see Kuntalaki 1995). In 
both cases the Commission has put into question the satisfaction of the competitive neutrality 
principle in the operations of the enterprises (see Capobianco and Christiansen 2011). The historical 
alternatives (Zeitlin 2007) proposed in the 1980s (Ahonen 1987) for the comprehensive statutory 
tailoring of the institutional form of the company for the purposes of the Finnish national 
government and this country’s local governments never came true. The 2013 amendment to the 
Finnish Local Government Act (Kuntalaki 1995) does not rule out transforming local government 
public enterprises into co-operatives, associations or foundations to satisfy the European 
Commission criteria of competitive neutrality , but the resilience of the institutional form of the 
company makes it improbable that the other forms will find many applications soon. 
 
 The European Commission ban on the institutional form of the public enterprises of Finnish local 
governments justifies the expectation of imminent privatizations during the latter half of the 2010 
with the establishment of new companies in which these governments will have the sole or majority 
holdings. This suggests the emergence of new companies of energy generation, water supply and 
sanitation, and hospitals (see Statistics Finland 2014), whereas fewer changes in institutional forms 
in local government housing services and real estate management can be expected, as the company 
form had become common in these other functions before the Commission ban. However, the 
institutional form of the company is not immune to criticisms expounded from the viewpoint of the 
Nordic traditions of public sector transparency and openness (Erkkilä 2010) and deep-going 
democratic local self-government (Kröger 2012). 
 
9 Conclusions and discussion 
 
 The answer of this article to its first research question on the diffusion of institutional forms of 
company holdings of governments pinpoints the direct or indirect foreign origins of many of the 
current and historical Finnish institutional forms. The application of the company form to organize 
business holdings of the Finnish government in 1931 derived from Weimar Germany, which was 
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the leading global metropolis that Finland amply emulated between the start of its independence in 
1917 and the end of democracy in Germany in 1933 (for more on the global metropolitan 
orientations of Finland, see Kanerva and Palonen 1987). The several Finnish government 
acquisitions of majority holdings in companies by means of targeted stock issues since the early 
1930s deployed models well entrenched in the Finnish private business world in those days after 
having arrived earlier in the country from abroad. It was also sufficient for Finland to follow 
examples of other countries to fill voids in the country’s industrial structures since the 1920s by 
means of extending government business holdings, to internationalize companies in which the 
Finnish government had holdings by means of exports and establishing foreign subsidiaries since 
the 1950s, to privatize government holdings since the 1990s, and to maintain government strategic 
minority holdings in companies after the 1990s.  
 
 This article answers its second research question on the adoption and adaptation of institutional 
forms of government holdings in companies with evidence on the expansion of the company form 
since the 1930s and the adaptations made to this form since the same decade by means of public 
interest legislation that qualifies the provisions of the generic Company Act in selected companies. 
According to public interest legislation qualifying the Company Act , Parliament has nominated the 
executive board of the broadcasting company Yleisradio Ltd ever since 1949. As far as local 
government holdings in companies are concerned, the foremost adaptation of the Company Act is 
comprised of the possibility allowed in this act that the shareholders’ meeting passes company by -
laws that prohibit the company from distributing dividends and make the company into an 
equivalent of a non-profit organization. 
 
 The third research question asked about the search for political legitimacy rather than 
performance by means of changes in institutional forms of government business activities. As 
indicated above, Weimar Germany had much to recommend it in Finland at the beginning of the 
1930 as a politically legitimate source for a new institutional form of government business holdings. 
The Anglophone world had replaced Germany decades before global waves of privatization 
billowed ashore in Finland in the 1990s. Important mediators of influences concerning government 
holdings of companies in Finland have included the OECD (Alasuutari and Rasimus 2009, OECD 
2005, Capobianco and Christiansen 2011, Christiansen 2011), one of whose guideline publications 
has received an official standing in the Finnish governance of national government holdings in 
companies (OECD 2004). More lately, the European Commission bans on the Finnish national 
government and local government institutional forms of public enterprises have made these forms 
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illegitimate not only in the political but also the legal sense and contributed to further applications 
of the institutional form of the company. 
 
 From a theoretical point of view, the results of this article emphasize tensions between flexibility 
in selecting, maintaining and detailing institutional forms of government holdings in companies on 
the one hand, and governance challenges arising from this flexibility and the resulting high degrees 
of complexity on the other. The current governance of national government holdings of companies 
in Finland combines arrangements set up to ensure predictability of the government holdings in 
companies with exclusions, the governance of some these holding by the Prime Minister’s Office 
with governance by the line ministries, and the direct governance of company holdings by a unit at 
the Prime Minister’s Office with a holding company to govern other holdings. Moreover, the 
holding company arrangement has not succeeded to eliminate politics from the government 
minority holdings in companies. Last but not least, the Social Security Institution and the statutory 
pension funds add to the complex governance of the Finnish public sector holdings in companies.  
 
 The practical policy implications of this article emphasize the virtues of institutional forms 
introduced and maintained on pragmatic grounds as opposed to rigorous principles. Never arisen by 
way of nationalization, the history of the Finnish national government and local government 
holdings in companies is punctuated with pragmatic considerations at the time of their 
establishment or government acquisition. Partial or fuller privatizations have also been carried out 
on pragmatic rather than principled grounds, although not necessarily without contentious 
opposition. The more recent European Commission interventions examined in the article represent 
aberrations from the pragmatic mood towards adversary procedures that are not without problems if 
considered from the viewpoint of Nordic traditions of transparency, openness, and democratic local 
self-government. However, the results of this article also practically imply that limits to the 
complexity of institutional forms should be drawn somewhere. 
 
 The pragmatism of selecting institutional forms for national and local government holdings in 
companies in Finland may not have been deep enough in certain respects. For reasons examined in 
this article, the business holdings of the Finnish national government and local governments have 
been developing towards a monoculture of institutional forms derived from the Company Act either 
as such or supplemented with public interest legislation or company by-laws making the company 
into an equivalent to a non-profit organization. The Finnish Local Government Act as amended in 
2013 does mention the possibility that the municipalities may ensure competitive neutrality not only 
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by means of turning their public enterprises into companies, but alternatively by means of such 
institutional forms as co-operatives, associations, or foundations. However, by the mid-2010s the 
actual applications of these alternatives were still practically nonexistent (Kallio and Kuoppakangas 
2013). 
 
 This article suggests future research articles and comprehensive comparative studies on the 
holdings of federal, national, state and local government companies in Finland and in other 
countries. The closest comparators for Finland are the other Nordic countries Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark and from among other countries Austria and France (Christiansen 2011). However, 
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Table 1 – Current and historical forms of government business holdings in Finland 
 National or local government responsible for all 
commitments of the enterprise 
National or local government responsible for 
the commitments of the enterprise only 




 Full separation from the 
government budget  



































V Only the Company Act is 
applied; this act concerns all 
companies whether held by 
public-sector or private-
sector owners 

























by means of 
company by-









or a local 
government 
only a holder 
of equity  
Conditional 
rights 
None None Borrowing 
rights may 
be awarded 
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Table 2 – Antecedents of national government company holdings until 1918 
Name First ante-
cedent  
History of institutional forms of the holdings  Company 
since 
Ownership 2014, % 
Posti 
Group plc  
1811  Government agency 1811–1931, older type 
public enterprise 1931–1990, newer type 
public enterprise 1990–1994  
1994 FG 100% 
Destia plc 1811 Government roads agency 1811–2001, 
newer type public enterprise 2001–2007 
2008 Bought by private-




1858 Government agency 1858–1931, older type 
public enterprise 1931–1989, newer type 
public enterprise 1989–2015  
2015  FG 100 %  
Stora Enso 
plc 
1860 Forest industry company with government 
majority holdings 1918–1998, part of the 
Swedish-Finnish Stora Enso plc since 1998  
1860 FG 25 %, Swedish 
owners 27 %, SSI 10 
%, pension funds 9% 
VR Group 
plc 
1862 Government railway agency 1862–1931, 
older type public enterprise 1931–1988, 
newer type public enterprise 1989–1994 
1995 FG 100% 
Nokia plc 1865 Important origins in the telecommunications 
company Televa Ltd held by the Finnish 
national government, acquired by Nokia plc 
in steps during 1974–1981  
NA No government 
holdings left in Nokia 
plc 
Elisa plc 1882 A private sector telephone association 
1882–1994; the Finnish government 
holdings have their origins in a 2008 
acquisition from Icelandic shareholders  
1994 FG 10% 
Sampo 
Bank plc 
1897 Government post savings bank and Post 
Bank enterprise 1887–1997, since 2001 the 
majority owners comprise private-sector 
financial industries 
1997  FG 12% 
Outo-
kumpu plc   
1910 Company partnership between the 
government and private-sector owners 
1910–1921, government agency 1921–1932 
1932 FG 22%, SSI 3%, 
pension funds 2%  
Telia-
Sonera plc  
1918 Government agency 1918–1931, older type 
public enterprise 1931–1989, newer type of 
public enterprise 1990–1994, since 2002 
part of the Swedish-Finnish 
telecommunications company Telia-Sonera 
1994 FG 8%, Swedish 
government 37% 
For the institutional forms of the holdings see Table 1. FG signifies the Finnish government, SSI, the Social 
Security Institution, and NA, not applicable or not available. All pension funds indicated are Finnish, statutory, 
and included in the public sector in national and European Union official statistics. Ownership figures indicate 
shares of votes in the shareholders’ meeting. All fractions except for 50.1% have been rounded. The sources 
comprise the publication Ownership Steering 2015 and company websites. 
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Table 3 – Origins of national government company holdings from 1918 to World War Two 
Name First ante-
cedent  
History of institutional forms of the holdings  Company 
since 
Ownership, % 
Kemira plc 1920 First, chemical industries without a definite 
institutional form 




1921 First, forest industries without a definite 
institutional form 
1932 NA (part of Stora-
Enso plc, Table 2) 
Fortum plc 1921 First, electricity generation without a definite 
institutional form 
1932 FG 51%, SSI 1%, 
pension funds 2% 
Finnair Ltd 1923 First, airline with private-sector majority 
holdings, government majority holdings since 
1946 
1923 52%, pension funds 
12% 
Patria plc 1920s First, government defense industry workshops 
without a definite institutional form, later, a 
number of older type public enterprises 
1997 FG 100%  
Yleisradio 
plc 
1926 First, a private-sector broadcasting company, 
government majority holdings since 1934, 
public interest legislation since the beginning 
1926 FG 100% 
Alko Ltd 1932 Alcohol company, with public interest legislation 1932 FG 100% 
Veikkaus 
Ltd 
1940 Betting company, with public interest legislation  1940 FG 100% 
See the explanations at the end of Table 2. 
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VTT  1942 Government technical research 
agency 1942–2015  
2015  FG 100 % 
Vapo Ltd 1945 Older type public enterprise 1945–
1984  
1984 FG 50.1%, local private-sector 
energy companies 49.9% 
Valmet plc 1946 Metal industry enterprise based on a 
fund outside the government budget 
1946–1952, independent company 
1952–1999 and since 2013, part of 
another company 1999–2013 
1952 
 
FG 11%, pension funds 7%, a 
Swedish company 14% 
Neste Oil 
plc 
1947 Part of another company 1998–
2005; independent company in 
1947–1998 and since 2005 
1947 
 




1960 Metal industry company; majority 
holdings acquired by a Swedish 
company in 2011 
1960 FG 10% of the Swedish owner 
company  SSAB plc 
See the explanations at the end of Table 2. 
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Table 5 – Newer national government and local government company holdings 
Name First ante-
cedent  





Solidium Ltd 1991 Became a holding company of 
government minority portfolios in 
2007 
1991 FG 100% 
Gasum Ltd 1994 Natural gas system operator and 
importer company 
1994 FG 75%, Gazprom 
(Russia) 25%  
Metso plc 1999 The government holdings derive 
from the Metso plc acquisition of 
Finnish government holdings in the 
metal industries 
1999 FG 12%, pension 
funds 10% 
Tieto plc 1999 Created in a merger of a company 
held by the government and a larger 
private-sector computing company 
1999 FG 10%, pension 
funds 9% 
Companies of local 
governments 
NA Companies held by local 
governments have increased in 
importance only since the 1990s  
NA NA 
See the explanations at the end of Table 2.  
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Table 6 – Governance of public sector holdings in companies in Finland, 2015 









Parliament, the government headed by the 
Prime Minister, and individual ministers 

















Subdivisions Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) Line 
ministries 

























































Stora Enso P 
Tieto P 









Stora Enso P  
Outokumpu P 
Fortum P  
Neste Oil P 
 
 






Neste Oil P 
Metso P 
Tieto P 
Companies  29  12  22  NA 1,853 NA 

















0 % Gasum, 
100 % Posti, 
Solidium and 
VR, 50.1 % 
the others  





None None None 
P indicates public trading with company stocks, MSAH, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, MEC, Ministry of 
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Education and Culture, MTC, Ministry of Transport and Communications, and NA not available or not 
applicable. The combined share of the employees indicated in this table is 14 per cent of all Finnish 
employment in companies and the combined share of the turnover indicated in the table is 20 per cent of the 
total turnover of all Finnish companies. For more on individual companies see Tables 2–5. The source of the 
table is the publication Ownership Steering 2015.  
 
